This should sound surprising. Surely free markets and stable political systems are a necessary precondition to capitalist economic growth. Today, this has "vanished from sight. There would still be a high and perhaps rising level of ethnic and nationalist violence, since those are impulses incompletely played out, even in parts of the post-historical world.
In Fukuyama was named deputy director of the U. The catch, however, was that we had now gone as far as it was possible to go. It is still not clear whether the Soviet people are as "Protestant" as Gorbachev and will follow him down that path.
History should be viewed as an evolutionary process. The role of the state in agriculture was reduced to that of a tax collector, while production of consumer goods was sharply increased in order to give peasants a taste of the universal homogenous state and thereby an incentive to work.
In this sixteen-page treatise that captured international attention, he proposed that the collapse of Communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe signaled the end of historical progress and the de facto victory of liberal democracy over all other forms of political ideology.
There is no doubt that contemporary democracies face any number of serious problems, from drugs, homelessness and crime to environmental damage and the frivolity of consumerism. But are consumerism and technology, as he suggests, really progressive?
He especially singled out Islam, which he described as having "bloody borders". If contemporary constitutional government has indeed found a formula whereby all are recognised in a way that nonetheless avoids the emergence of tyranny, then it would indeed have a special claim to stability and longevity among the regimes that have emerged on earth.
As some on the left have long realised, Fukuyama was performing an ideological sleight of hand. Chinese competitiveness and expansionism on the world scene have virtually disappeared: Security and freedom have been achieved, and consequently history has ended. What was remarkable about liberal capitalist democracy, Fukuyama thought, was that it had managed to put a lid on the more destructive expressions of megalothymia, encouraging citizens to direct such energies into socially harmless expressions, such as mountaineering or competitive sports.
For example, it is commonplace in the West to interpret the reform movements first in China and most recently in the Soviet Union as the victory of the material over the ideal - that is, a recognition that ideological incentives could not replace material ones in stimulating a highly productive modern economy, and that if one wanted to prosper one had to appeal to baser forms of self-interest.
Moreover, when Islamic states have actually been created, they were easily dominated by the powerful Western states.
Totalitarianisms of the Right and Left have kept us too busy to consider the latter question seriously for the better part of this century. China could not now be described in any way as a liberal democracy.
The anti-capitalist Left, however, was a busted flush. After establishing in Part I why we need to raise once again the possibility of Universal History, I propose an initial answer in Part II by attempting to use modern natural science as a regulator or mechanism to explain the directionality and coherence of History.
Nietzsche believed that modern democracy represented not the self-mastery of former slaves, but the unconditional victory of the slave and a kind of slavish morality.
A latent military force is more likely to have an effect than actual deployment. Modern historians would tend to seek the roots of such conflicts in antagonisms between social classes or some other modern economic category, being unwilling to believe that men would kill each other over the nature of the Trinity.
He outlines his rationale for supporting the Bush administration, as well as where he believes it has gone wrong. Many of the wars and revolutions fought since that time have been undertaken in the name of ideologies which claimed to be more advanced than liberalism, but whose pretensions were ultimately unmasked by history.
What remains an open question is whether these developments — dramatic as they are — will actually result in anything.
Weber notes that according to any economic theory that posited man as a rational profit-maximizer, raising the piece-work rate should increase labor productivity.Jan 12, · Complete summary of Francis Fukuyama's The End of History and the Last Man.
eNotes plot summaries cover all the significant action of. Oct 22, · Perhaps this very prospect of centuries of boredom at the end of history will serve to get history started once again.
(From "The End of History?" By Francis Fukuyama, The National Interest, No. The End of History? * Francis Fukuyama** IN WATCHING the flow of events over the past decade or so, it is hard to avoid the feeling that something very fundamental has happened in world history. The past year has seen a flood of articles commemorating the end of the Cold War, and the fact that "peace" seems to be breaking out in many.
The following entry presents an overview of Fukuyama's career through Fukuyama's reputation centers primarily upon the ideas presented in “The End of History?” In this essay, he attempts. Nov 23, · Francis Fukuyama’s essay is another useful resource for us as it represents a different aspect of the civilization exclusivity question.
“The End of History?” concerns the rise and fall of major ideologies such as absolutism, fascism and communism, and suggests that human history should be viewed in terms of a battle of. Francis Fukuyama's influential essay 'The End of History?' announced the triumph of liberal democracy and the arrival of a post-ideological world.
But was it just a rightwing argument in disguise?Download